The main focus of this study is an analysis of the impact on civil and political rights of democracy promotion strategies applied by the three European organizations in Moldova in the 1990s-early 2000s. Nowadays democracy promotion is at the top of the agenda of policy-makers around the globe. The results of these democracy promotion activities are quite mixed: some of them seem to work in certain cases, others to have no effect whatsoever. There is also a lack of consensus regarding the effectiveness of various democracy promotion strategies in the scholarly literature. This study aims to contribute to the existing literature by expanding the analysis to a new case (Moldova), focusing on one sector (civil and political rights) and comparing the effects of the two types of democracy promotion strategies (incentive-based and socialization-based). The study argues that domestic actors in Moldova tended to respond more to incentivebased democracy promotion strategies than to socialization-based ones, and it also shows through qualitative analysis and process-tracing of the data that the absence of membership conditionality does not necessarily presuppose the failure of incentivebased methods.
Introduction
The transformational changes that swept across the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s pushed democracy promotion to the top of the agenda of policy-makers around the globe. As a result, the literature on democracy promotion, which has also grown considerably in recent years, increasingly recognises the importance of the changed international environment in the 1990s for providing new opportunities for democracy promotion. 1 Studies on the international dimension of democratization often come to similar conclusions: that any rigorous analysis of the democratization process should not overlook its international dimension, and that outside actors (and other factors) can influence domestic politics. However, often the research on the role of one set of such actors, international organizations (IOs), tends to focus on a single institution and the particular strategy it applied. 2 For instance, a considerable body of literature analysed the effects of EU conditionality on the domestic politics of the East European candidate states. 3 These studies seem to disregard the vast diplomatic efforts of the Council of Europe (COE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or they tend to focus on broad democratic trends rather than particular policies. 4 Cases regarded as democratic "laggards" or "hybrids", which fall beyond the sphere of interest of the EU and other regional organizations and which, as a consequence, do not show clear signs of interaction between international democracy promotion and domestic factors, also tend to be underrepresented in these researchers' agendas.
This study aims to address these gaps in the scholarly literature by analysing how the OSCE, the COE and the EU influenced the government of Moldova to promote civil and political rights during the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s. 5 The article starts with setting out conceptual and theoretical framework of analysis and discussing some insights from the existing literature. It then proceeds with setting the domestic context: it discusses peculiarities of transition in Moldova and also summarises the activities and strategies of the three European organizations involved in Moldova. Then the empirical analysis of the cases based on qualitative data follows.
Finally, the article draws a number of conclusions and discusses some policy implications.
Democracy promotion by IOs: views from the literature and conceptual framework
External actors can promote, protect and enforce democracy around the world in a number of ways. Diane Ethier defines various methods of promoting democracy as democracy promotion strategies (DPS) -strategies which have been used in recent years by western governments and international organizations to induce states to achieve democratic transition or consolidation. 7 Given the growing importance of democracy promotion especially since the early 1990s various theory-and policyrelated questions arise. When are DPS more likely to be effective? Which methods of democracy promotion can be expected to succeed in influencing domestic actors' behaviour and what mechanisms govern the interaction between external democracy promotion and domestic factors? The recent trend in the scholarly literature is an increasing number of studies that attempt to address these questions and fill the gap in democratization and international relations literatures. 8 As Burnell and Calvert recently pointed out, 'contemporary scholarship is now well past the point where it was valid to say the international dimensions of Democratization had been neglected'. 9 The conclusions of one such study are particularly relevant to this analysis, namely, that not all IOs are equally effective in democracy promotion; that some DPS seem to be more effective than others; that incentive-based methods such as membership conditionality are more effective in changing domestic actors' policies than socialization-based methods.
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A number of criteria can be used to classify DPS. 11 Various external actors use different DPS depending on their resources, democracy aid objectives, and organizational structure. This article follows Kelley's approach and focuses on two specific DPS or, as Kelley defines them, "specific mechanisms through which international institutions may influence state behaviour" 12 : conditionality and normative pressure. In order to avoid conceptual confusion, this article views political conditionality as an incentive-based DPS, and normative pressure as a socializationbased DPS. The reason for such categorization rests on distinction between two different logics of action they follow: a 'logic of consequentiality' and a 'logic of appropriateness', respectively. 13 In brief, according to the logic of consequentiality, domestic actors follow norms because they want to maximize their individual utility and decrease the costs of non-compliance. According to the logic of appropriateness, actors follow norms for intrinsic reasons: 'based on personal dispositions informed by social beliefs, they do what is deemed appropriate in a given situation and given their social role'. 14 Therefore, IOs choose their democracy promotion activities according to their preferred logic of action in relation to a particular democratising state: for instance, teaching, convincing and arguing within the logic of appropriateness and social influence, material threats and promises within the logic of consequentiality.
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Conditionality implies provision of particular benefits by an IO to a democratising state under certain conditions. An IO can use negative and positive incentives in order to make a democratising state to comply with conditionality.
Negative incentives comprise sanctions and the threat of sanctions in respect of international financial support to governments and economic development aid. Positive incentives offered by an IO to a democratising state can include institutional membership, association status, trade benefits, technical assistance and other types of democracy aid, as well as an increase of aid as an additional reward in case of satisfactory performance of the recipient. Overall, the effects of political conditionality on behaviour of domestic actors 'correspond with a rationalist set of assumptions that define domestic actors as cost-benefit-calculating, utility-maximising actors'. 16 Democratising states comply with political conditionality because either positive incentives ('carrots') on offer are crucial for them, or the costs of negative incentives ('sticks') exceed the costs of compliance with conditions posed by democracy promoters.
The defining feature of the second mechanism of influence, normative pressure, is that IOs do not link any concrete incentives to behaviour but rely solely on the use of norms to either persuade, shame, or praise domestic actors into changing their policies. 17 For instance, normative pressure occurs when an IO suggests a recipient government certain policy changes without offering any reward other than approval by an IO. By using normative pressure to promote democracy IOs rely on a set of socialisation processes such as social influence or persuasion. Various causal mechanisms operate here. The persuasion mechanisms cause policy change due to changing minds, opinions and attitudes and affecting identity 18 of domestic actors. The social influence mechanisms are rationally based: actors will conform to policy change requests from the outside because they value certain social rewards (such as status, legitimacy, a sense of belonging) 19 or want to avoid social punishments (such as shaming, shunning, exclusion). 20 Thus, IOs can 'socialize' democratising states into democratic practices via either persuasion or social influence, or both: they can teach and persuade as well as shame and pressurize domestic actors into democratic policies. socialization-based DPS and only in case of non-compliance and/or lack of democratic progress they proceed to using more material incentives. In this regard, it becomes challenging to separate effects of the two types of DPS and link them with policy results.
As Kelley similarly notes: 'since conditionality is always used as an extension of normative pressure, however, evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality alone is more difficult'. 23 One of the methodological possibilities to tackle this challenge is via detailed case study with process tracing that provides information on the timing of events and action, as well as motivation, attitudes and rhetoric of actors on both sides of the democracy promotion relationship. Also, analysing instances of normative persuasion applied in the absence of incentive-based methods can strengthen the power of inferences on effectiveness of the two types of DPS. Counterfactual analysis might also prove to be beneficial in disentangling the effects. This article makes use of all three methods.
Setting the domestic context: transition to democracy in Moldova
Moldovan politics after independence can be characterized as a period of high political instability and economic stagnation. Like other post-Soviet republics Moldova suffered from unstable government coalitions and subsequent frequent changes in government, even between elections. Moldova has had 6 prime ministers in the period from 1990 till now.
The current prime-minister, Vasile Tarlev, has the longest 'political life-span' -5 years in power so far. Both parliamentary and presidential elections have been bitterly contested, bringing to the political scene new presidents and causing considerable changes in the party and ideological composition of the parliament. 24 As a consequence, the Moldovan party system is usually characterised as extremely pluralist and fragmented especially in the 1990s. 25 Overall, elections are considered free and fair, however some international observers report irregularities prior to the elections such as unequal campaigning opportunities and bias of the electoral code rules in favour of the governmental party. 26 The
Moldovan constitution underwent a significant change in 2001: a semi-presidential system of government was changed to a parliamentary system vesting more powers in the national legislature including election of the president and approval of the cabinet. Thus, Moldova became one of the few parliamentary regimes in the former Soviet Union, which acquired all necessary attributes in order to meet the standard minimum definitions of democracy. 27 In light of such positive developments, which one might regard as a good start in any Democratization process, a fair question arises: did democracy follow in Moldova?
Unfortunately, it did not. Moldova can be regarded as one of the hybrid regimes which despite the establishment of some democratic procedures remains largely authoritarian and weak in democratic terms. A high level of political pluralism in this case is not due to an inherent difficulty to establish and implement democratic institutions but rather due to fragmentation of the Moldovan government and weakness of its leaders to impose a truly authoritarian rule. 28 The 2006 Freedom House's Democracy Score (FH DS) for Moldova is 4.96, which places it on the borderline between such regime type categories as 'transitional government or hybrid regime' (FH DS=4) and 'semi-consolidated authoritarian regime'
(FH DS=5). 29 The Polity IV Scores for Moldova are on a more positive side: in the period from 2001 to 2004 Moldova's Democracy Score was equal to 8, which represents the lowest threshold for a country to be considered democratic. 30 The discrepancy between the two scores does not seem to be very high if placing Moldova among hybrid or transitional regimes that have certain democratic minimums in terms of procedures but lack democratic substance.
Two major structural factors influenced Moldova's prospects for democratization.
One of them is the slow and contradictory pace of the economic transition. In the first half of the 1990s Moldova managed to conduct a number of market-oriented reforms earning 'a reputation as one of the leading reformers in the region'. 31 As a result of these reforms, Thus, the demands of the population for more sources of alternative information were met to a certain extent. However, Moldovan governments seems to be very slow in adopting and implementing legislation in order to ensure the freedom of media in Moldova.
Moreover, there was some backsliding away from democratization and respect for civil and for press freedom in Moldova is 4.5, which puts it into a 'partly free' category. 35 There are also significant implementation problems. Moldovan authorities were always quite positive in their pro-democratic rhetoric and recognise the respect for civil and political rights as a necessary attribute of any viable democracy, but they were quite slow and at times even reluctant to transform their words into actions. The question is: did international organizations (IOs) have any influence on the government's determination to pursue reforms in the civil and political rights sector in Moldova?
European organizations and promotion of civil and political rights in Moldova
Most of the European organizations involved in democracy promotion in Moldova recognise the importance of the rule of law and respect for civil and political rights for achieving meaningful democratic consolidation. However, there is a certain variation in As part of its election monitoring activities in the Moldovan parliamentary elections of 1994, 1998 and in the 1996 presidential elections, the OSCE expressed a number of concerns regarding the use of broadcast media during electoral campaigns and pointed out that the government should secure a more equal access to the media for all contestants participating in the elections. 45 However, the OSCE's concerns did not gain much attention on the domestic scene. 46 The 49 However, the authorities ignored the OSCE's recommendations regarding this and in September 1999 adopted quite a restrictive legal provision on language quota in broadcasting. 50 In sum, despite rhetoric that the government was working on these issues, no real Justice Minister Ion Morei confirmed that this decision 'reflected a response to the concerns expressed by the COE over the suspension'. 66 In terms of the COE's strategy on this matter we can classify it as conditionality because firstly, clear deadlines were indicated for change of the government's position, and secondly, implicit threats concerning Moldova's membership in the COE and its compliance with the COE's human rights acquis were voiced. 67 There was also another important factor which changed government's position on this issue -promise of a positive incentive. As the then head of the EU's TACIS Office in Chisinau revealed, in early February the government was notified that the European Commission's delegation was going to visit Moldova at the end of February in order to discuss possibilities to disburse the €15 million credit and the results of negotiations would also depend on the political situation in the country. 'We wish to fulfil all our commitments necessary for improving our relations with the EU, COE and other European organizations. And for that we should engage in a democratic dialogue with our political opponents and the society'. 78 An active participant at the protests in March and April 2002 and a member of the oppositionist PPCD party noted:
'In 2002 the COE and other European institutions were very important in pressuring the government to change its undemocratic policies. They were our important allies in the process'. 79 Moreover, even a member of the governmental party, PCRM, admitted that policy changes were instrumentally motivated:
'The pressure from the outside was intensifying. We could not ignore it and had to re-consider our position. Besides, European organizations promised us closer cooperation and more assistance: how could we not take this into account?'. 80 Hence, the discussed cases show that European institutions were very much part of the policy change process, and their involvement became more effective when conditionality and new incentives were applied.
Moreover, the COE was quite vigilant in following up the degree of implementation of its demands. A few months later, after monitoring the situation on the ground, PACE adopted another resolution stating its dissatisfaction with the quality of the new law on
Teleradio-Moldova and demanded further changes in the drafting procedures. 81 The authorities complied again, and although the political opposition and NGOs were still not completely satisfied with the degree of independence of state television, these were clear signs that the authorities were willing to cooperate with both the opposition and the COE.
In sum, the analysis above shows that human rights policy process in Moldova has had a great deal of variation in the 1990s-early 2000s. At the beginning the authorities were extremely slow in adopting new legislation in conformance with international standards despite vast socialization-based efforts by the COE and the OSCE. In those cases where the European organizations were not engaged at all, the government did even worse: it passed laws that were incompatible with international standards. However, we witnessed considerable policy changes only when the institutions became more actively involved and switched to explicit incentive-based DPS. Moreover, the timing of several cases supports the causal connection between incentives and policy change because, as Kelley notes, 'it is possible to see a pattern of issue-linkage by the institutions and response by policy makers within a short period of time'. 82 The policymakers' rhetoric, which accompanied policy changes, also confirms the influence of the European institutions and incentive-based DPS on government's behaviour.
The cases of policy deterioration in early 2000s are crucial for the article's main argument in one important aspect. A contra-argument regarding the ineffectiveness of the socialization-based DPS to bring about policy changes could be that of 'duration versus type of involvement'. 83 The fact that the government, although slowly, still adopted some legislation could be actually in favour of the socialization-based methods: due to the nature of the democratic socialization process it takes time for the domestic elites to acquiesce its undemocratic practices and translate democratic norms into meaningful policies. In this regard, one can argue that socialization-based DPS applied by the COE and the OSCE to It is important to note, however, that this study by no means questions the effectiveness of membership conditionality applied by IOs. Rather, this study posits that the absence of membership incentive does not always precipitate the failure of democracy promotion strategies. IOs can still promote democracy and influence domestic policy as long as they choose the most appropriate methods for that. As this case shows, additional incentives as well as stricter monitoring of how international legal commitments are fulfilled might help. The important policy implication of this is that IOs need to be more committed to their democracy promotion endeavours and be more responsible when designing their methods of how to encourage domestic political elites towards further democratization.
